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Abstract 
Designed to test finasteride’s potential to cut the incidence of prostate cancer, the Prostate Cancer Prevention Trial yielded a paradoxical finding: a 
decrease in low-grade PCa accompanied by an apparent increase in high-grade disease. As a result of these questionable benefits and apparent 
harms, the FDA has not approved finasteride for chemoprevention. While recently published follow-up data from PCPT suggests that concern over 
the risks of finasteride may be unfounded, it also shows that the drug has not saved lives. It may seem that the one remaining role for finasteride is 
as an adjunct to PSA testing, serving to reduce the risk of overdiagnosis. However, other harms connected to finasteride call even this secondary 
function into question. 
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Introduction 
The finasteride story begins some forty years ago with 
the discovery of a cluster of male pseudoherm-
aphrodites in the Dominican Republic with a hereditary 
deficiency in 5-α reductase, the enzyme responsible for 
the conversion of testosterone into the more potent an-
drogen, dihydrotestosterone (DHT).  Resembling girls 
as children, these males have an undeveloped prostate 
as adults [1]. Given the numbers of aging men who 
suffer from benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), re-
searchers began to wonder if the same enzyme defi-
ciency could be induced in them with beneficial results. 
Finasteride, a 5-α reductase inhibitor (5-ARI), was syn-
thesized. First tested on human subjects in 1986 and 
approved as Proscar (5 mg) in 1992, finasteride enabled 
the non-surgical treatment of BPH, thereby contributing 
to the transformation of urology itself [2]. 
Finasteride and Cancer Preven-
tion 
But if a naturally occurring 5-α reductase deficiency 
suggested the possibility of inducing the same deficien-
cy to treat a “benign” condition, it also suggested that 
reduced levels of DHT might lower the risk of a malig-
nant one−prostate cancer (PCa), a disease in which 
DHT is implicated, and from which the Dominican 
pseudo-hermaphrodites appear to be exempt. Shortly 
after finasteride was approved as a BPH treatment, the 
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National Cancer Institute launched a large placebo-
controlled trial to test the drug’s preventive potential.  
The Prostate Cancer Prevention Trial (PCPT) ran from 
1993 to 2003, when it was stopped because that poten-
tial had been realized: the finasteride group saw a 24.8% 
relative reduction in the incidence of PCa, the trial’s 
primary endpoint [3]. 
    While the idea of a pill that reduces cancer risk—in 
addition to relieving lower urinary tract symptoms and 
reducing the risk of acute urinary retention—is certain-
ly attractive, two factors cast a cloud over the promise 
of finasteride. First, how meaningful was the 24.8% 
figure? According to the PCPT data, almost half the 
cancers in the study were found not as a result of suspi-
cious PSA and/or digital rectal exam but the study pro-
tocol itself—specifically, a research or end-of-study 
(EOS) biopsy “offered” to subjects who had not been 
biopsied for cause. (The intent of the EOS biopsies was 
to right the imbalance of biopsies caused by the PSA-
lowering effect of finasteride.) In their careful analysis 
of the PCPT data in 2010, FDA reviewers judged the 
findings of the research biopsies to be of questionable 
significance, in that the biopsies themselves were “not 
reflective of clinical practice” [4]. If large numbers of 
cancers detected in PCPT were not insignificant, how is 
it that cancer was found in fully 24.4% of the placebo 
group—men at low risk, according to the PCPT entry 
criteria—while the lifetime risk of PCa death stands at 
approximately 3.5%? Moreover, the FDA reviewers 
found that many biopsies that had actually been per-
formed at the end of the study for research purposes 
were misclassified as for-cause. If one adjusts the num-
bers accordingly and considers only the cancers detect-
ed in for-cause biopsies as clinically significant, the 
take-home figure of 24.8% dwindles to 14%, and the 
findings of the PCPT become less impressive. 
    However, it was not so much the questionable bene-
fits of finasteride as its possible harms that spoiled the 
festivities. At its conclusion in 2003 the PCPT yielded 
an unexpected and paradoxical result: in addition to the 
reduction of PCa by 24.8% in the treatment group, the 
study found a 26.9% increase in Gleason 7−10 cancers. 
Thus, while finasteride decreased the incidence of low-
grade PCa—in particular, Gleason 6—it was for some 
reason associated with an increase of the cancers of 
greatest concern.  (The REDUCE trial of the dual 5-
ARI dutasteride yielded similar results in a population 
at elevated risk) [5]. As a result of this inverted risk-
benefit profile, in December 2010 the Oncologic Drugs 
Advisory Committee of the FDA recommended 17-0 
against the use of finasteride for purposes of prevention. 
In 2011, the FDA ordered revisions to the labels of 5-
ARIs stating that they are not approved for the preven-
tion of PCa, and issued a notice stating that men treated 
with 5-ARIs for BPH were at elevated risk of high-
grade PCa. While finasteride remains in use as a BPH 
treatment, in the decade since the striking results of the 
PCPT were filed it appears that few doctors have rec-
ommended the off-label use of the drug to reduce the 
risk of PCa. 
    Ever since the PCPT results appeared in 2003, many 
have suspected that the increase in high-grade cancer 
found in the finasteride group was an artifact of the 
study, in that finasteride shrinks the prostate, thereby 
making detection more likely. (There is also a theory 
that by suppressing Gleason ≤ 6 cancer, finasteride re-
duces interference with the high-grade cancer signal.)  
This explanation was post-hoc, however, and as such 
resembled an effort to explain away unwanted infor-
mation. In the absence of solid evidence of finasteride’s 
safety, the FDA was right to interpret the increase in 
high-grade cancer conservatively. Wrote FDA review-
ers in response to the Merck application, “Chemopre-
vention strategies administer drugs to otherwise healthy 
individuals. Therefore, only the highest level of evi-
dence that demonstrates a statistically persuasive and 
clinically meaningful benefit in the context of a favora-
ble risk-benefit analysis supports the use of a drug for 
cancer chemoprevention”. The mixed results of the 
PCPT do not meet this standard.   
    The picture may or may not have changed with the 
emergence of data from the Health Professionals Fol-
low-up Study in 2012. According to a report presented 
to a meeting of the New England section of the Ameri-
can Urological Association, study subjects who took 
finasteride for BPH at any time since 1986 showed a 25% 
reduced risk of PCa, a 39% reduced risk of Gleason 7 
disease, and no increase or decrease of Gleason 8−10 
disease. In the light of concerns raised by PCPT about 
high-grade cancer (defined in PCPT as Gleason 7−10), 
such reassurance was welcome. 
    However, the incidence of PCa is really a surrogate 
for the outcome that matters most—death. In the case 
of Gleason ≤ 6 disease, the surrogate endpoint is an 
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especially tenuous one, in that the cancer may not even 
manifest itself clinically. While the PCPT ran for a full 
decade, following the study population all the way to 
death would have required a much longer trial, and so 
the designers settled for the secondary outcome, as un-
reliable as it may be. (According to FDA reviewers, 
there were but five PCa deaths on the treatment arm of 
the PCPT and six on the placebo arm. By contrast, 400 
died of cardiac disorders.) Now that we have reached 
the twenty-year mark since the launch of PCPT, one 
would like to know how the study population fared.  
Did the excess of high-grade cancers on the finasteride 
arm lead to an excess of deaths? Recently, a follow-up 
report on the PCPT population appeared, and in the 
PCPT tradition it yielded results encouraging on the 
one hand but deflating on the other. 
    The conclusion of the follow-up study reads: 
    Finasteride reduced the risk of prostate cancer by 
about one third. High-grade prostate cancer was more 
common in the finasteride group than in the placebo 
group, but after 18 years of follow-up, there was no 
significant between-group difference in the rates of 
overall survival or survival after the diagnosis of pros-
tate cancer [6]. 
    If the excess of high-grade cancer were actually 
fueled by finasteride, this effect has had time to mani-
fest itself in an excess of mortality on the finasteride 
arm; yet no such excess has been detected. It appears, 
then, that the increase in high-grade cancers associated 
with finasteride in PCPT may actually have been an 
artifact of detection bias, as many theorized. It should 
be noted, however, that the study reports overall mor-
tality, not prostate-cancer mortality, and that men with 
high-grade cancer in the PCPT placebo group could 
have seen anything from a 30% decrease in the risk of 
death to a 27% increase. 
    But if the risk of increased mortality suggested by 
PCPT did not materialize, neither did the promise of 
decreased mortality.  It turns out that the reduced inci-
dence of PCa in the finasteride group did not translate 
into fewer deaths; the risk-reduction was driven entirely 
by a decrease in cancers that rarely lead to death. Just 
as PCPT left questions about the meaning of a 24.8% 
decrease of an over-detected cancer of ambiguous sig-
nificance, we are now left wondering what the point 
might be of taking a drug that reduces no risk except 
that of being diagnosed with a cancer of dubious clini-
cal import. Is the finasteride question much ado about 
little? 
    Even as the PCPT began in 1993, mass screening for 
PCa was catching on in the United States, and by the 
end of the decade millions of men had PSA testing in 
the aggressively promoted belief that early detection 
equals saved lives.  (Of course, if all those who learned 
to think of themselves as survivors of PCa really had 
their lives saved, the death rate of the disease would 
have been higher than before screening.) The timing of 
all this bears comment. Over the ten years of the PCPT, 
doctors did not go ahead and prescribe finasteride off-
label to prevent PCa; they waited for the results of the 
PCPT to see if it prevented PCa, and if so, with what 
accompanying risks. In the simultaneous case of PSA 
testing, doctors did not wait for the results of random-
ized trials to materialize; as if a public-health emergen-
cy existed, they went ahead and screened as many men 
as possible, even though the benefits of PSA testing 
were assumed while the harms that followed from test-
ing—not least, impotence—were undeniable.   
    Furthermore, the distortions that make PSA testing 
look more effective than it is were already known when 
mass screening began. Both “lead-time bias” (the illu-
sion that detecting cancer earlier extends survival) and 
“length-time bias” (the tendency of screening to detect 
slower, more indolent malignancies) were understood 
well enough to be cited in a 1993 editorial by one of the 
prime movers of PSA testing, William Catalona [7]. Dr. 
Catalona also took the position that it is more conven-
ient for the doctor to fold a PSA into the patient’s 
blood-work than to secure informed consent [8]. To 
compound the neglect of informed consent, at the time 
prostate-cancer screening established itself in the Unit-
ed States, “the popular media had not yet fully publi-
cized the dilemmas and controversies of treatment for 
prostate carcinoma” [9]. To men with little knowledge 
of PCa, well might the dramatic increase in diagnosed 
cancer as a direct result of mass screening seem like 
evidence of the urgent necessity of screening itself.      
    With the screening of the eligible male population—
whether informed or not—in shopping malls, parking 
lots, churches, and workplaces as well as clinics, Amer-
ican urology set in motion a program that may have 
contributed to a reduction of PCa mortality, but at the 
cost of untold overtreatment with serious adverse ef-
fects. It is presumably because of the harms that flow 
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from screening that perhaps only 50% of male internists 
in the United States undergo PSA testing [10].    
    Now that the hope of saving lives with finasteride 
seems to have gone up in smoke, its one remaining pre-
ventive role is to buffer the harms of PSA testing it-
self—harms that have caused professional bodies, one 
after another, to scale back their endorsements of mass 
screening and affirm the importance of informed con-
sent. Finasteride, it seems, is not a life-saver but a bit of 
insurance. Take it and you reduce the risk of being di-
agnosed with a cancer of doubtful significance, like so 
much detected in the PCPT. Whatever headline about 
finasteride the PCPT yielded, it also showed just how 
much latent PCa is there to be found if you are really 
determined to find it. 
Finasteride and Adverse Events 
As it happens, finasteride does have another use in pre-
vention, albeit not preventive medicine. Marketed in a 
1-mg dosage as Propecia, it serves to prevent hair 
loss—another affliction those born with a 5-ARI defi-
ciency are spared. Readers of this journal may not be 
aware that lawyers in the United States are actively 
recruiting men to join a number of suits against Merck, 
the maker of Propecia, on the grounds that the drug 
causes permanent sexual impairment among other woes.  
Propecia was approved by the FDA in 1997. 
    In the PCPT population (median age at randomiza-
tion: 63), a high percentage of the finasteride group 
reported loss of libido (65.4%) and erectile dysfunction 
(67.4%), though the corresponding numbers in the pla-
cebo group were almost as high: 59.6% and 61.5%.  
The American Society of Clinical Oncology/American 
Urological Association evidence-based guideline on the 
use of 5-ARIs for chemoprevention notes adverse 
events associated with the drugs, including decreased 
libido and erectile dysfunction, but judges them re-
versible [11]. In 2011 the FDA ordered revision of the 
labels of both Propecia and Proscar to reflect reports of 
erectile dysfunction that persisted after cessation of 
treatment, and in 2012, in response to further reports, it 
ordered further revisions “despite the fact that clear 
causal links between finasteride (Propecia and Proscar) 
and sexual adverse events have NOT been established” 
(FDA’s emphasis). Evidently the same regulatory body 
that rigorously reviewed the PCPT data down to the last 
digit felt compelled to lend some credence to word-of-
mouth information. Concerning Proscar, the FDA wrote 
in 2012: 
    FDA reviewed 131 cases of erectile dysfunction and 
68 cases of decreased libido associated with the use of 
finasteride 5 mg submitted to the drug sponsor’s 
worldwide safety database between 1992 and 2010. 
Where information was available, these reported events 
of erectile dysfunction and decreased libido lasted for at 
least several weeks after drug discontinuation.  
    Thus in at least some of the 199 “cases” of sexual 
problems “associated” with finasteride (5 mg) no in-
formation was available to the FDA itself. We seem to 
be witnessing a snowball effect, whereby unverified 
reports—in a word, rumors—somehow achieve regula-
tory recognition.   
    Trying to trace reports of the irreversible sexual ef-
fects of finasteride to their source is indeed like trying 
to track down a rumor. (If sexual problems allegedly 
continued “for at least several weeks” after Proscar was 
stopped, the problems were not irreversible.)  As I write, 
lawyers allege that men’s lives are being ruined by 
Propecia, and as if trying to leverage anecdote into real-
ity these lawyers cite a study in the Journal of Sexual 
Medicine that cites European regulatory notices that 
cite reports of “persistence of erectile dysfunction after 
discontinuation of treatment with Propecia.” As for the 
study itself, it tested no interventions; lists among its 
own limitations a post-hoc approach, selection bias, and 
recall bias; admits the subjects were recruited from one 
of the authors’ practices and from a Propecia help fo-
rum; and notes that subjects attributed to the drug not 
only their sexual complaints but a number of problems 
from fatigue to “cognitive difficulties” [12]. The reason 
blinded, placebo-controlled trials are run in the first 
place is to correct for the sort of biases and loose causal 
attributions built into this study.  
    It seems circulating anecdotes of debilitating sexual 
problems were picked up by European regulators and 
validated by a methodologically deficient study which 
in turn serves as an authority for the lawyers.  But if 
anecdotes can be amplified into something like evi-
dence, sexual problems themselves can be amplified by 
anxiety about such problems.  
    A well-conducted study also published in the Journal 
of Sexual Medicine shows the power of even cautious 
language to inflame sexual problems. Struck by the 
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difference between rates of sexual side effects associat-
ed with finasteride in clinical trials and the higher rates 
observed in practice, researchers in Italy devised an 
experiment to account for it. One hundred twenty mid-
dle-aged men diagnosed with BPH were randomly di-
vided into two groups, one of which received 5 mg fi-
nasteride described only as a “compound of proven 
efficacy for treatment of BPH,” while the other re-
ceived the same drug along with the notice that “it may 
cause erectile dysfunction, decreased libido, and prob-
lems of ejaculation, but these are uncommon.”  In con-
trast to the PCPT population, the study subjects ranged 
in age from 45 to 65 and had no sexual dysfunction at 
the start. At one year, each of the adverse events oc-
curred about three times more often in Group II, with 
erectile dysfunction leading the list—no less than 30.9% 
of men in Group II reported it.  Just as a consent form 
in a clinical trial can cue subjects even in the placebo 
group into experiencing specified side effects, so the 
“counseling” received by Group II prompted these pa-
tients to experience the very troubles they were advised 
of, and which they undoubtedly hoped to avoid.   
    In total, no less than 43.6% of the advised men re-
ported one sexual dysfunction or another, compared 
with 15.3% of men in Group I—such was the anxiogen-
ic effect of the disclosure language [13]. (Contrary to 
circulating reports, none of the dysfunctions was irre-
versible.)  As if the negative expectations set up by this 
language drowned out all reassurance, the statement 
that sexual harms due to finasteride are uncommon 
became untrue over the course of the study. Should a 
doctor then keep silent about these harms, lest he or she 
magnify them? That would be unethical, given that “the 
sexual dysfunction related to taking finasteride for 
BPH…might be the sort of side effect that would be 
material to some patients’ decision whether to undergo 
the treatment” [14].  
    Far from being an anomaly, the findings of the BPH 
study are consistent with the entire body of research on 
what is known as the nocebo effect (the reverse of the 
placebo effect). Moreover, similar results emerged from 
a study in which men taking the antihypertensive drug 
metoprolol were randomly sorted into three groups, of 
which one was told METO might induce erectile dys-
function, though “this side effect is rather uncommon”; 
one was told the drug was METO but given no infor-
mation about sexual effects; and one was neither given 
the name of the drug nor informed of sexual effects. 
After 60 days, the incidence of erectile dysfunction was 
32% in group 1, 13% in group 2, and 8% in group 3 
(P<0.01) [15].  
    Taken together, these studies point to the perhaps 
unsuspected risks of informed consent [16]. 
Conclusion 
While PSA testing does not set up negative expecta-
tions like a study of the nocebo effect, it does play on 
anxiety, does tend to snowball (as suggested by its rap-
id evolution over the 1990s from experimental begin-
nings to the largest mass screening program in the 
United States), and is driven by the power of emotive 
messages. Consider an analogy, then, between the 
Propecia phenomenon and mass PSA testing.  Propecia 
causes sexual problems, but probably not of the devas-
tating severity alleged by interested lawyers; PSA test-
ing may reduce PCa deaths, but probably not by as 
much as the public has been led to believe, and in any 
case it also leads inexorably to overtreatment.  Men can 
become so convinced of the harms of Propecia that they 
attribute their problems to it, from anxiety itself to 
“mental fogginess.” Men can also become so convinced 
that PSA testing saves lives that they firmly believe 
themselves survivors even if the cancer they had re-
moved was unlikely ever to cause problems.   
    It is because PSA testing grew into a mass movement, 
with the excesses inseparable from such a movement, 
that the urologists who set this phenomenon going are 
now looking for ways to rein in its harms.  Introduced 
to the market around the same time as PSA testing itself, 
finasteride has been nominated for this role.  However, 
finasteride brings its own harms: sexual harms. If these 
can be tripled by disclosure language that plays them 
down, then use of finasteride by healthy men as an ad-
junct of PSA testing would be ill-advised—unless they 
want to take a drug like sildenafil to manage the risks 
of the finasteride being taken to lessen the risks of 
screening for PCa. 
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